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INSURANCE-TRANSFER OF POLICY AS SECURITY
IN VIOLATION OF NON-ASSIGNMENT CLAUSE
Plaintiff bank loaned money to a third party and for collateral
took a deed of trust upon an automobile. Plaintiff notified Defendant
insurance company by letter that it held a lien against the automo-
bile, requesting that its lien be noted on a rider to be attached to
the policy. Two days later the automobile was destroyed by fire, and
Defendant insurance company paid the third party in full for the
automobile. Upon claim for the amount of its lien by Plaintiff bank,
Defendant contended (1) that since it had never received the letter
and was unaware of the lien and (2) since the policy provided that
no assignment should be binding upon it unless its consent was
endorsed thereon, and no such consent was endorsed on the policy,
it was not liable to Plaintiff bank. The lower court decided in favor
of Plaintiff bank.1 On appeal, held, affirmed. The jury's finding that
Defendant received the letter must stand; the transfer of a fire in-
surance policy as collateral security for the payment of a debt is not
an assignment within the meaning of the provisions against assign-
ment without consent of insurer endorsed on the policy. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. Mutual Savings and Loan Co., 193 Va. 269,
68 S. E. 2nd 541 (1952).
(1) One of Defendant's unsuccessful contentions was that it
never received Plaintiff bank's letter, and that it was unaware of
the lien. All authorities hold that mailing a letter, properly addressed
and stamped, raises a presumption of its receipt by the addressee.2
Some authorities hold that the positive denial by the addressee uf
the receipt of such letter renders the presumption of little weight,3
or may even, if entirely uncontradicted, entirely overcome it.4 How-
ever,Virginia's decisions are to the effect that a denial of receipt of
such a letter raises an issue of fact to be determined by the jury.5
Therefore, the jury in the lower court having found that the letter
1. The original action was commenced by the holder of Hartford's draft,
after a stop payment order. Mutual was brought in as a party plaintiff
under Code of Virginia 8-226 (1950) when Hartford filed an affidavit
of interpleader.
2. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jennings, 232 Ala. 438, 168 So.
173, 177 (1936); Arnold v. Darby, 49 Ga. App. 629, 176 S.B 914(1934); Petition of Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 298 Mass. 75, 9
N.E.2d 718 (1937).
3. Gibson v. Rouse, 81 Wash. 102, 142 P. 464 (1914).
4. Ripy v. Cloverleaf Life and Casualty Co., 9 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1925).
5. Adams v. Plaza Theatre Inc. 186 Va. 402, 43 S.E.2d 47 (1947); Yanago
v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 164 Va. 258, 178 S.E. 904 (1935).
was received, the Supreme Court of Appeals was compelled to
accept the verdict and consider the letter as having been received.
Practical considerations commend the Virginia view. To permit a
person to escape liability by merely denying the receipt of a letter
would encourage perjury of a type particularly difficult to uncover.
(2) It has been held that where there is a prohibition in a
policy forbidding the assignment of the policy of insurance without
the consent of the insurer, the policy may still be the subject of a
valid pledge.6 The reason for this distinction is that such pledge
does not affect the personal relationship, i. e., the ownership of the
property by the insured, upon the faith of which the policy has
been issued.7 The stipulations in the policy contemplate a general
or complete unconditional assignment of the ownership of the policy,
and are not intended to work a forfeiture of the rights of the insured
where the policy is assigned merely as collateral security for a debt.8
Like other contracts, policies of insurance are to be upheld
when possible.9 In case of doubt and uncertainty,. the language of
the policy is to be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally
in favor of the insured.10 Likewise, language limiting liability will
be construed strongly against the insurer."I Therefore, the recent
Hartford case is squarely in line with prior Virginia decisions in
applying an equitable rule of construction of contracts to the diffi-
cult but important distinction between assignment of the insured
property and assignment of an interest in the proceeds of the policy.
JOHN WILLIAM HORNSBY, JR.
6. Janesville State Bank v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 200 Min. 312, 274
N.W. 232 (1937); Ellis v. Kreutzinger, 27 Mo. 311 (1858).
7. Central Union Bank v. New York Underwriters Insurance Co., 52 F.2d
823 (4th Cir. 1931).
8. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Smith, McKinnon & Son 117 Miss. 327, 78 So.
289 (1918).
9. Palmetto Fire Insurance Co. v. Fansler, 143 Va. 884, 129 S.X. 727(1925).
10. Scholz v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 145 Va. 694, 134 S.E. 728(1926); Williams v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 139 Va. 341, 123
S.E. 509 (1924).
11. Newsoms v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., 147 Va. 471, 137
S.. 456 (1927).
